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Abstract
In a banking model with imperfect information, I nd that more precise information
increases the economys vulnerability to bank runs. For low transparency levels, depos-
itors cannot distinguish bad from good states based on their information and, absent
liquidity shocks, have no incentives to withdraw early. As transparency increases, and
signals become more informative, depositors incentives to withdraw strengthen and
run-proof contracts become costlier in risk-sharing terms: the bank must o¤er less to
early withdrawers to prevent runs. When transparency is high enough, the bank would
rather forgo return and hold excess liquidity than choose a run-proof deposit contract.
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1 Introduction
The transparency of the nancial system is a recurrent topic in the agenda of regulators.
Calls for enhancing the transparency standards to which nancial institutions are held are
common, especially after nancial crises. Some examples of these instances are the Basel
III regulatory standards; the enhanced disclosure requirements imposed on money market
mutual funds by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2010; and the creation of the
Enhanced Disclosure Task Force by the Financial Stability Board in May 2012. Yet, there
are situations in which the desirability of increasing transparency has been widely debated,
as in the case of the public disclosure of the results of stress tests.1
The main argument for transparency is that it improves market discipline; i.e., it leads to
better monitoring of nancial institutions and their managers by customers, trade counter-
parties, and investors. I show, in contrast, that increasing transparency in the banking sector
may increase fragility and decrease welfare. In particular, increasing transparency, i.e., the
fraction of depositors that receive the correct signal about the value of the banks assets,
strengthens the coordination motives among depositors. The increased strategic comple-
mentarities in the depositorsactions increase the banks vulnerability to runs (its fragility),
decrease risk sharing and, thus, reduce welfare.
The model builds on Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and extends it by modifying the asset
structure and by introducing imperfect and asymmetric information among depositors about
the fundamentals of the economy. In my model, depositors receive private signals of the value
of the banks assets. The precision of the private signals determines the fraction of people
with the correct signal and, thus, is a measure of the economys transparency. When signals
are not very informative, the depositorswithdrawal decisions are independent of their signals
and only depositors who have been hit with a liquidity shock choose to withdraw early. As the
1See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (June 2012), Lopez (2003), SEC,17 CFR x 270.30b1-7,
Goldstein and Leitner (2013) and "Lenders Stress over Test Results," Wall-Street Journal; March 5, 2012.
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precision of the signal becomes stronger, depositors have more incentives to run: depositors
with bad signals put more weight on their signal while those with good signals assign a higher
likelihood to depositors with bad signals running. Withdrawal decisions become dependent
not only on the private signal each depositor gets but on their expectations about how other
depositors will behave. Therefore, increasing the transparency of the economy can give rise
to strategic complementarities in the depositorsdecisions which lead to multiple equilibria
in the withdrawal game among depositors and make the bank vulnerable to runs.
By a¤ecting the depositorswithdrawal motives, the precision of the signals also a¤ects
the deposit contract chosen by the bank. In particular, when depositors receive more infor-
mative signals, it is costlier for the bank to choose a run-proof allocation. As information
becomes more precise, and the coordination motives grow stronger, the bank must promise
a lower amount to early withdrawers to prevent runs. This, in turn, decreases risk sharing
and welfare. In fact, when the transparency level of the economy is high enough, run-proof
contracts become too costly and the bank would rather forgo return and hold excess liquidity
to minimize the cost of ine¢ cient bank runs.
In my model, an increase in transparency a¤ects welfare ex-post and ex-ante. Ex-post, for
each given choice of portfolio and deposit contract of the bank, transparency strengthens the
depositorscoordination motives and, thus, increases the banks vulnerability to runs. Ex-
ante, the increased incentives of depositors to run shrink the set of run preventing contracts
from which the bank may choose and the bank can attain less risk sharing among depositors.
The mechanism described by the model is not only relevant for banks. The forces at play
are also present whenever there are strategic complementarities in the investorsredemption
decisions as, for example, in the case of mutual funds.2 As the model shows, the stronger
the strategic complementarities, the more costly it is to increase transparency and the more
likely it is that doing so will make the economy fragile. In this respect, a banking model is
2Chen et al. (2010) document the presence of strategic complementarities in mutual funds.
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the starkest environment in which to highlight the mechanism.
There is a growing literature analyzing the e¤ects of enhancing transparency in the
nancial sector.3 My paper contributes to this literature by highlighting a novel mechanism
through which transparency is costly, especially for nancial institutions.
As I mentioned above, the main argument in favor of enhancing transparency is that
it improves market discipline. In a single bank model, Calomiris and Kahn (1991) show
that transparency and disclosure are necessary for bank runs to impose market discipline
e¢ ciently. As in my paper, transparency a¤ects how the threat of bank runs shapes the
banks choices. However, while I focus on how the coordination motives of depositors a¤ect
the banks ability to provide insurance against liquidity shocks, they focus on the ability of
bank runs to discipline the banks and deter moral hazard.
Another way in which transparency a¤ects nancial institutions is through information
externalities. Yorulmazer (2003) shows that the liquidation of healthy banks cannot be
avoided unless there is perfect information about the banksassets, while in Chen and Hasan
(2006) improving the accuracy of the information depositors have about banks can lead to the
contagion of bank runs. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) show that the threat of information
contagion (spillovers) can lead banks to make correlated investments and amplify systemic
risk. Information externalities do not only arise across banks. As my paper shows, they can
also be present among the depositors of a single bank. In Chari and Jagannathan (1988)
there is a signal extraction problem which is a¤ected by the probability of an agent being
informed. As the economy becomes more transparent, and agents are more likely to be
informed, uninformed agents have larger incentives to run which may lead to runs even in
the absence of adverse information. Similarly, my paper exhibits information externalities
among depositors but it also considers coordination externalities which are at the heart of
the mechanism through which transparency a¤ects the depositorsincentives to run.
3See Landier and Thesmar (2011) and Goldstein and Sapra (March 2014) for a comprehensive analysis
of the costs and benets of disclosure and transparency in the nancial system.
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As shown by the global games literature that follows Morris and Shin (2002), transparency
can also a¤ect the coordination among agents. Iachan and Nenov (forthcoming) analyze the
conditions under which changes in the quality of information available to the agents will
lead to coordination failures. In these papers, transparency a¤ects an agents beliefs over
the fundamentals of the economy while in my paper the quality of information also changes
his expectations over how other agents will behave, i.e., it a¤ects not only the agentsability
to coordinate but also their incentives to do so.
Finally, in my paper, as in Hirshleifer (1971), increasing transparency decreases risk shar-
ing, albeit through a di¤erent mechanism. In Hirshleifer (1971) keeping idiosyncratic shocks
undisclosed can generate room for risk sharing agreements among agents. Before the shocks
are realized all agents have incentives to enter into such contracts. However, when trans-
parency increases and these shocks are unveiled the risk sharing incentives disappear. Agents
with bad shocks would still like to receive transfers from the agents with good shocks, who
would be unwilling to provide them. This mechanism is commonly known as the Hirshleifer
E¤ectand it refers to the disclosure of information about the event against which agents
want to insure.4 In my model, increasing transparency decreases risk sharing even though
the incentives to share risk remain unchanged.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 characterizes the constrained e¢ cient allocation. Section 4 describes the equilibria in
the withdrawal game and the banks problem. Section 5 analyzes the e¤ects of improving
information on welfare and fragility. Section 6 concludes. All omitted proofs are in the
appendix.
4Leitner (2014) and Bouvard et al. (2014) analyze the optimal transparency level for a bank from the
regulators point of view focusing on the e¤ects on risk sharing and systemic risk.
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2 The Model
There are 3 periods, denoted t = 0; 1; 2, one good and no discounting. There are two types
of agents in this economy: depositors and a bank. Following Diamond and Dybvig (1983),
there is a continuum (measure 1) of identical depositors whose preferences are given by
Ui (c1; c2) = iu (c1) + (1  i) (c1 + c2)
where u (0) = 0, u0 > 0, u00 < 0 and i 2 f0; 1g is an idiosyncratic shock realized in period
1. If i = 0 consumer i is a "late" consumer whereas if i = 1 he is an "early" consumer.
Idiosyncratic type shocks, i, are identically and independently distributed across depositors
and Pr (i = 1) = .
5 there is a continuum of agents,  is also the fraction of early consumers
in the economy in period 1. Each consumer is endowed with 1 unit of the good at t = 0
and learns his "type" i at the beginning of period 1. Types are private information of the
depositors. Without loss of generality I assume that consumers deposit all their endowment
in the bank.
There is a competitive bank that maximizes the expected utility of its depositors. The
bank has no endowment but has access to two assets (or technologies): a short-term safe
asset and a long-term risky asset. The short-term asset acts like a storage technology: 1
unit invested in this asset in period t yields 1 unit in period t + 1. The long-term asset is
risky and its return depends on the period in which the asset is liquidated and on the state
 2 fL; Hg, where Pr ( = j) = j, j = H;L. If the state of the world is , a unit invested
in the long-term asset yields r1 () units if liquidated in period 1 or  if liquidated in period
2. r1 () is the early liquidation value of the asset and is given by
r1 () =
8<: rL if  = LH if  = H
5Postlewaite and Vives (1987) analyze bank runs when the number of depositors is nite and liquidity
idiosyncratic shocks are private information and may be correlated.
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Figure 1: Asset structure
where rL < 1 and H > L  1. I assume that E (r1 ()) 
P
j=L;H jr1 (j) < 1 to make
sure that the long-term asset does not dominate the short-term asset. The asset structure
is depicted in gure 1.6
When the state is low,  = L, the return of the long-term asset is lower (than in the
high state) if liquidated at maturity and there is a cost of liquidating the long-term asset
early, i.e., r < 1. In this case, the value of the banks assets is low and, as I will show later,
depositors have more incentives to withdraw early. Therefore, the bank needs to liquidate
more long-term assets to meet early withdrawals. The costly early liquidation of the long-
term asset in the low state captures the idea of a re sale: when the bank is in distress it
sells its assets at a price lower than its value.
In period 0; banks and consumers enter a deposit contract. Following Allen and Gale
(1998), the deposit contract allows the consumer to withdraw either c units at date 1 or the
residue of the banks assets at date 2 divided equally among the remaining depositors. If
the promised amount c cannot be paid to all early withdrawers, the bank liquidates all its
assets and divides the proceeds among those withdrawing early equally. No sequential service
6In contrast to Allen and Gale (1998), in which information-based runs can improve risk sharing by
making the allocation e¤ectively state contingent, bank runs are always ine¢ cient in my model.
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constraint is imposed, i.e., whether a depositor is the rst or last to run is irrelevant since all
depositors who withdraw early get the same consumption.7 After consumers deposit their
endowment but before any uncertainty is revealed, the bank chooses the deposit contract,
c, how much to invest in the long-term asset, L, and how much to invest in the short-term
asset, 1  L, to maximize consumersexpected utility.
In period 1, after the depositor type shock has been realized, the state  is realized.
Depositor i does not observe , but he observes a private signal ei of the return of the
long-term asset  where
Pr
ei = jj = j = p  1
2
for all i for j = L;H:
Signals are conditionally independent across depositors and each depositor gets a correct
signal with probability p. The precision p also represents the total fraction of depositor who
receive the correct signal. In this sense, p can be thought of as a measure of the economys
transparency. If p = 0:5 the private signal received by depositor i is not informative: receiving
the signal or not does not change his information on the value of the banks assets. In this
case the bank is opaque: the distribution of information across depositors is independent
of the state realized. If p = 1 the private signal is perfectly informative and all depositors
observe the value of the banks assets after observing the signal. In this sense, when p = 0:5
the bank is not transparent at all, whereas if p = 1 the bank is completely transparent.8
Depositors use their signal ei to learn about the true state  using Bayess Law. The posterior
7This is the same as having a standard deposit contract when banks are competitive. A standard deposit
contract promises xed amounts c1 and c2 at periods 1 and 2 respectively and divides all the available
resources between withdrawers if the promise cannot be met. Since the bank maximizes depositors expected
utility, it will never choose to have idle resources in period 2 and thus whatever the choice of c2, this promise
will never be met. Thus, the contract will reduce to the deposit contract just described.
8One can also think of this private signal as having a common component, which captures public infor-
mation, and an idiosyncratic component captures mistakes people make in processing this information. The
appendix formalizes this interpretation of the private signals.
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Figure 2: Timing
distribution of  given the signal ei is given by
qj  Pr

 = jje = j = pj
pj + (1  p) i j; i = L;H, j 6= i:
Since p > 0:5, the probability of being in state i is higher when the signal is i than when
it is not, i.e., qi > (1  qj) i; j = H;L, j 6= i. For simplicity, I will assume that j = 0:5 so
that qj = p for j = L;H. Finally, after depositors learn their type and their private signal
on , they choose whether to withdraw their funds from the bank in period 1 or in period 2.
Figure 2 shows the timing.
2.1 Discussion of assumptions
In addition to the information structure, the model described above departs from standard
banking models in two ways: risk neutrality for late-consumers and the asset structure.
Assuming that late-consumers are risk neutral simplies the analysis and makes the model
tractable. The asset structure assumed di¤ers from that in Diamond and Dybvig in that
there are no liquidation costs when the return of the long-term asset is high. The asset
structure in this paper can be thought of as a reduced form of interbank markets, as in Allen
et al. (2009), in a one-bank model. In their paper, aggregate shocks to the liquidity demand
9
a¤ect the price at which banks can sell their long-term assets: periods of high liquidity
demand result in re sales and a low liquidation value, and periods of low liquidity demand
in high liquidation value and no discount. Even though this paper abstracts from liquidity
shocks (i.e.,  is xed), when the return of the long-term asset is low there will be higher
incentives for depositors to withdraw early, and in this sense the demand for liquidity will
be higher.
3 Optimal Deposit Contract
Consider the problem of a planner who can distinguish early from late consumers and ob-
serves the realization of the state ; but is constrained to using the kind of deposit contract
described in the previous section. This planner chooses a portfolio, (1  L;L), and a deposit
contract,
 
ce; cl ()

. He promises ce to early consumers and gives cl () to late consumers in
state , where cl () is the residue of the assets at t = 2 divided by the total number of late
consumers. As described above, if ce cannot be paid to all early consumers, all assets would
be liquidated at t = 1 and distributed equally among early consumers. In this case the bank
will be bankrupt.9
I will refer to the allocation that arises from choosing the optimal deposit contract as
the constrained e¢ cient allocation. Though I am not using the traditional terminology,
this allocation is the one chosen by a planner who observes the depositors types but is
constrained to using deposit contracts.
The planner solves the following problem
max
ce;L
E

u

min

ce;
(1  L) + r1 ()L


+ (1  )E cl ()
9Given the asymmetry in the liquidation costs across states, the optimal intermediation contract between
the bank and the depositors is state contingent. If r (H) = rH , deposit contracts would be optimal in this
environment.
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subject to
L 2 [0; 1]
0  ce
(1  ) cl () =
8<: (1  L)  ce + L if ce  (1  L)maxnL   ce (1 L)
r1()
; 0
o
if (1  L) < ce
The rst constraint states that the planner cannot invest more than the available resources
in the long-term asset and that there is no short-selling. The last two sets of constraints are
the physical constraints on resources. The amount promised to early consumers has to be
non-negative and the amount that is left for late consumers depends on whether the total
amount promised to early consumers is less than the liquidity available at t = 1; 1   L. If
the planner chooses to give early consumers less than what he invested in the short-term
asset, no long-term asset is liquidated early and the available resources at t = 2 are given
by (1  L)   ce + L. If the planner chooses to give early consumers more than what he
invested in the short-term asset, some of the long-term asset has to be liquidated early and
the available resources at t = 2 are 

L  ce (1 L)
r1()

in state .
I will assume that the utility function is such that the constrained e¢ cient contract does
not imply bankruptcy for the bank in any state, i.e., ce  (1  L) + rLL. 10
In the terminology of Cooper and Ross (1998), a planner (or bank) chooses to hold excess
liquidity if and only if the deposit contract chosen satises ce < 1  L:
Lemma 1 The planner will choose not to hold excess liquidity. Moreover, the planner will
choose to hold just enough liquidity to pay early consumers, i.e., ce = 1  L:
If ce > 1   L the planner is forced to liquidate some long-term asset early which is
not e¢ cient given E [r1()] < 1 < E []. If ce < 1   L; the allocation is ine¢ cient since it
10To have this it is su¢ cient to assume that u0
 
rL


> (H 1)(1 rL)
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allocates too many resources to the short-term asset whose expected payo¤ is less than that
of the long-term asset. Therefore, the planner will choose ce = (1  L) :
Using the previous lemma, the planners problem can be rewritten as follows:
max
ce
u (ce) + E () (1  ce)
subject to
ce 2 [0; 1] :
Assuming an interior solution, the rst order condition of this problem is given by
u0 (ce)  E () = 0: (1)
Since u00 < 0, this solution is unique.
From now on I will assume that ce 2 (0; 1) where ce is dened by (1). Under this
assumption the constrained e¢ cient allocation is given by
u0 (ce) = E ()
cl () =
 (1  ce)
1   ,  = L; H
L = 1  ce;
Given that the planner observes the true state  and each depositors type shock i, the
precision p of the private signal received by depositors does not enter the planners problem.
The constrained e¢ cient allocation is independent of the precision of information, p, in the
economy.
4 Equilibrium
As in any nite horizon model, the equilibrium can be computed by backward induction.
I will start by characterizing the equilibrium of the withdrawal game between depositors
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in period 1 taking the banks choices of deposit contract and portfolio, (c; L), as given.
Then, I will look at the banks problem of choosing (c; L) taking into account the depositors
equilibrium behavior in period 1 for each pair (c; L) :
4.1 Withdrawal Game
To solve the withdrawal game between depositors, I will start by characterizing the benet
of withdrawing early for late consumers. With this in mind, I will show that three regimes
may arise depending on the liquidation strategy of the bank when the state is low. Finally, I
will show that, for certain choices of the bank, the withdrawal game has multiple equilibria.
All early consumers will choose to withdraw in period 1 since they do not value consump-
tion in period 2. Late consumersactions will depend on their signal, and on their beliefs
on what everyone elses actions. I will focus on symmetric equilibria of the withdrawal game
between consumers in period 1.
Denition 1 A symmetric equilibrium of the withdrawal game in period 1 is a prole  =
fL; Hg of withdrawing strategies, where j species the probability with which a late con-
sumer with signal e = j withdraws in period 1 such that, given , each depositor is acting
optimally given his signal.
Given this denition of equilibrium, the fraction of depositors who withdraw early in
state j given an equilibrium prole  is
j () = + (1  ) (pj + (1  p)i) ; i; j = L;H; j 6= i:
Given the fraction of depositors who withdraw in period 1 in state j; and the contract
and portfolio chosen by the bank in period 0, the bank can be in one of three regimes: no
liquidation, partial liquidation, and bankruptcy. In the no liquidation regime, the bank has
enough short-term asset to fulll all early withdrawals, i.e.,
j () c  1  L:
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In the partial liquidation regime, the amount invested in the short-term asset is not enough
to cover early withdrawals but all early withdrawals can be met by liquidating some of the
long-term asset, i.e.,
1  L < j () c  1  L+ r1 (j)L:
Finally, in the bankruptcy regime the bank cannot meet all early withdrawals even when all
of the long-term asset is liquidated, i.e.,
1  L+ r1 (j)L < j () c:
4.1.1 Benet from withdrawing early
Suppose that depositors observe  and that the equilibrium is given by . The benet of
withdrawing early for a late consumer will depend on the regime and on the equilibrium
strategies . As long as the bank is not in the bankruptcy regime, a depositor gets c if he
withdraws early and a positive amount if he withdraws at t = 2. If  is such that the bank
is in the no liquidation regime, the available resources in period 2 will be given by the return
of the long-term asset, L, plus whatever is left in the short-term asset after paying all the
depositors who chose to withdraw in period 1, 1 L j () c. In this case, a depositor who
withdraws late will receive
 
L+ 1  L  j () c

=
 
1  j ()

. In the partial liquidation
regime, some of the long-term asset is liquidated to meet the obligations in period 1. Since
in period 1 the short-term asset is not enough to pay c to all early withdrawers, D units of
the long-term asset must be liquidated early. D is such that the total amount obtained from
liquidating the long-term asset is equal to the di¤erence between the amount invested in the
short-term asset, 1 L, and the amount to be paid in period 1, j () c. Thus, D is given by
r1 ()D = j () c  (1  L) ; and the only resources left for period 2 are given by the return
of the unliquidated long-term asset,  (L D) : Finally, in the bankruptcy regime, all assets
are liquidated early and its proceeds are divided equally among early withdrawers, leaving
nothing for a depositor who chooses to withdraw late. Therefore, the gain from withdrawing
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early rather than late in state j is given by
h (j;) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
c  jL  j () c+ 1  L
1  j ()
if j ()  1 Lc
c 
j

L  j () c  (1  L) 1r1(j) 
1  j ()
 if 1 L
c
< j () 
1  L+ r1 (j)L
c
1  L+ r1 (j)L
j ()
if
1  L+ r1 (j)L
c
< j () :
Lemma 2 h (j;) is increasing in j () if and only if r1 (j)L+1 L < c <
(1  L+ r1 (j)L)
j ()
.
As the previous Lemma shows, there are strategic complementarities in the withdrawal
decision of depositors whenever there is risk sharing and no bankruptcy. If the amount
promised to early withdrawers is larger than the minimum return that they would have
received if they had invested on the portfolio themselves, i.e., there is no risk sharing, depos-
itors have more incentives to withdraw earlier the larger the fraction of earlier withdrawers.
In this case, early withdrawers impose an externality on late withdrawers by getting more
than their share of the portfolio and decreasing the payo¤ of late withdrawers. This exter-
nality will be present as long as the bank is not in the bankruptcy regime. If a late consumer
knows that the bank will be bankrupt it is always better for him to withdraw early but,
given the pro rata liquidation rule, the benet of doing so is decreasing in the amount of
depositors who withdraws early.11
Assume that the deposit contract, c, is such that early depositors are promised more than
the maximum return on the portfolio, i.e., c > 1 L+HL: In this case, it is easy to see that
withdrawing early is a dominant strategy for all agents since h (H ;) > 0 and h (L;) > 0
for all : In the remainder of the paper I will focus on the case in which c  1   L + HL
which implies the bank is never bankrupt when the high state H is realized. Moreover,
11The lack of strategic complementarities in all regimes for all bank choices prevents the equilibrium from
being unique in the withdrawal game at t = 1 for all possible choices of (c; L) : Also, the model does not
exhibit one-sided strategic complementarities as in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005).
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there is no need to distinguish between the no liquidation and partial liquidation regimes
when  = H since there are no liquidation costs in this state, i.e., r1 (H) = H . Therefore,
the distinction between the no liquidation, partial liquidation, and bankruptcy regime will
only apply to the regime that arises in the low state.
Let  (j;) be the expected benet for a late consumer from withdrawing early when
the signal is j and the equilibrium strategy is : Then, given the posterior probability p
and the function h, the expected benet is given by
 (j;)  ph (j;) + (1  p)h (i;) for j; i = L;H; j 6= i:
In equilibrium, a late consumer with signal j will choose to withdraw in period 1 if and
only if  (j;)  0; with equality if he chooses to withdraw randomly.
Suppose that p = 1 and that the state  was perfectly observed by depositors. If the
realized state was H , depositors would have a dominant strategy: all late consumers will
withdraw late regardless of , h (H ;) < 0 for all , and the equilibrium outcome would be
unique. However, if the state was L, the behavior of late consumers could depend on their
beliefs on the fraction of early withdrawers. In this last case we would be in the Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) world and the outcome would depend on which equilibrium is played.
If a late consumer believed all other late consumers would withdraw early, he would have
incentives to withdraw early. On the other hand, if he expected all other late consumers
to wait and withdraw late, he would rather wait to withdraw. These coordination motives
would give rise to multiple equilibria of the withdrawal game when the realized state was L.
Therefore, if the state was perfectly observable, coordination motives would only be present
in the low state and the incentives of late consumers to withdraw early would always be
greater in the low state, i.e., h (H ;) < h (L;).
Now suppose the transparency of the economy decreases and p drops below 1. In this
case, keeping the equilibrium strategy prole  xed, late consumers with low signals would
have lower incentives to withdraw early since now they assign a positive probability to being
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in the high state. The withdrawal incentives of late consumers with high signals are a¤ected
by two countervailing forces. On the one hand, they have higher incentives to withdraw
because they assign a higher probability to the low state occurring. On the other hand,
they anticipate that late consumers with low signals have lower incentives to withdraw early
which increases the benet of withdrawing late in both states. Hence, compared to the
case in which signals are perfectly informative, having imperfect information about the state
 decreases incentives to withdraw early for late consumers with low signals while it may
increase or decrease them for those with high signals.
Since depositors with high signals assign a higher probability to being in a high state
(in which there are no liquidation costs), if a late consumer with a high signal chooses to
withdraw early, then a late consumer with a low signal will choose to withdraw early as well.
This is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 If c < HL+ (1  L),  (H ;)  0 implies  (L;) > 0.
As shown in the following corollary, lemma 3 narrows down the possible equilibria of the
withdrawal game since there cannot be an equilibrium in which some late consumer with
high signal withdraws early and some late consumers with low signal does not.
Corollary 1 In equilibrium, L  H , with strict inequality if i 2 (0; 1) i = L;H:
The strategy I follow to compute the equilibria is as follows: I guess that a pair fL; Hg
among those in corollary 1 is an equilibrium, and then verify conditions on c and L such
that the strategy prole is indeed an equilibrium. This characterization can be found in the
appendix.
4.1.2 Sunspot Equilibria
For every pair (c; L) there exists at least one prole that is an equilibrium in the subsequent
withdrawal game, but this prole may not be unique.
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Proposition 1 There exists a nonempty set of deposit contracts, c, and portfolio choices,
L, such that the withdrawal game induced by those pairs (c; L) has multiple equilibria.
The proof of this proposition follows from propositions 8; 9; 10; and 11 in the appendix.
These propositions also characterize the types of multiplicity of equilibria that can arise. For
example, they show that for each pair (c; L), there is at most one equilibrium in which the
bank is bankrupt.
Dene by A (c; L) the set of possible equilibria in the withdrawal game given (c; L). The
outcome of the game played by the depositors will belong to this set; but, when A (c; L) is
not a singleton, it is not possible to predict which equilibria will be played. I assume that the
equilibrium that will be played among the elements of A (c; L) depends on the realization of
some exogenous random variable and allow for the probability distribution of this variable
to be non degenerate.
Denition 2 A sunspot equilibrium is a probability density function f : A ! (0;1) such
that some equilibrium within a set A  A is played with probability R
A
f (x) dx:
In a sunspot equilibrium, an equilibrium of the withdrawal game is always played and the
probability with which it is played depends on f , which can be thought of as the distribution
of some observable random variable on which depositors condition their beliefs on how others
will behave.
4.2 Banks Problem
In what follows I will focus on the banks problem in the initial period of the model taking
as given the behavior of depositors in the withdrawal game. To dene the banks objective
function, I rst need to dene the banks beliefs over how depositors will behave in the
withdrawal game for each possible choice of portfolio and deposit contract.
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In period 0 the bank chooses the deposit contract, c, and how much to invest in the short-
term and long-term assets, (1  L) and L respectively, to maximize depositors expected
utility taking the depositorsbest responses in the withdrawal game as given. The bank is
subject to two restrictions: L 2 [0; 1] and c  0. The rst restriction simply states that the
bank cannot invest more than the resources deposited by consumers and that there is no
short-selling. The second constraint places a restriction on the amount that can be o¤ered
as part of the deposit contract: depositors have limited liability and therefore cannot be
o¤ered negative amounts of c.
4.2.1 Expected Utility
As mentioned above, the withdrawal game may not have a unique equilibrium for some pairs
(c; L) 2 R+ [0; 1]. Since the expected utility depends on the fraction of early withdrawers,
which in turn depends on the equilibrium strategies , I will distinguish between expected
utility across equilibria as well as for di¤erent pairs of c and L. In what follows, I will denote
by j  j (c; L;) the fraction of early withdrawers in state j for a given equilibrium
 2 A (c; L) and a given pair (c; L). Since  and (c; L) determine the regime in which the
bank will be, and the amount left for late consumers depends on this regime, it is useful to
characterize expected utility under each regime.
No liquidation In the no liquidation regime, Lc  1  L and L 2 [0; 1]. In this regime,
all early withdrawers get the promised amount c independently of the state . A fraction
 of the depositors will be early consumers and get utility u (c), while a fraction j    of
depositors will be late consumers withdrawing early in state j and will get utility c. In
this region, no long-term asset is liquidated early. Therefore, in state j, the 1   j late
withdrawers each get
 
jL+ 1  L  jc

=
 
1  j

. Since late withdrawers are always late
consumers, they are risk neutral and therefore the total utility derived from late withdrawers
in state j is just jL+ 1 L jc. The expected utility given (c; L) conditional on being in
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a no liquidation regime is
EUNL (c; L;) = u (c) +
1
2
(L (c; L;) + H (c; L;)  2) c
+
1
2
[(L + H)L+ 2 (1  L)  L (c; L;) c  H (c; L;) c]
= u (c)  c+ 1
2
(L + H)L+ (1  L) :
Expected utility in this region does not depend on L or H and it is always increasing in
L since E () > 1: Therefore, conditional on being in the no liquidation region, it is optimal
for the bank to invest as much as possible in the long-term asset. In the no liquidation
regime expected utility is maximized when Lc = 1  L.
Partial liquidation In the partial liquidation regime, 1   L < Lc  1   L + rLL and
L 2 [0; 1]. As in the no liquidation regime, early withdrawers always get their promised
amount c but some long-term asset must be liquidated to keep this promise. Therefore, in
state H there are HL + 1   L   Hc units of the good to divide between (1  H) late
withdrawers, while in state L there are LL+ 1r (1  L)  1rLc units of the good to give to
the (1  L) late withdrawers. Expected utility in a partial liquidation regime is given by
EUPL (c; L;) = u (c) +
1
2
(L (c; L;) + H (c; L;)  2) c
+
1
2

LL+
1
r
(1  L)  1
r
L (c; L;) c+ HL+ 1  L  H (c; L;) c

:
The derivative of the objective function with respect to L is given by
@EUPL
@L
=
1
2
@L (c; L;)
@L

1  1
r

c+
1
2
(L + H)  1
2

1 +
1
r

:
Thus, if @L(;c;L)
@L
= 0; the bank will choose Lc = 1  L.
Bankruptcy If the bank is in the bankruptcy regime in the low state, 1   L + rLL <
Lc and L 2 [0; 1]. In this regime the bank cannot pay the promised amount c to early
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withdrawers in state L and thus liquidates all the long-term asset early, leaving nothing for
late withdrawers when  = L. Therefore, in the low state, which occurs with probability 0:5,
all early withdrawers get rLL+1 L
L
units of the good. Early consumers value it u

rLL+1 L
L

and L  late consumers value it rLL+1 LL . The (1  L) late withdrawers get 0 utility. In
the high state, the bank is able to pay the promised amount c to the H early withdrawers
( early consumers) and gives out HL+(1  L) Hc to the (1  H) late withdrawers (all
late consumers). Expected utility in this region is given by
EUB (c; L;) =

2
u (c) +

2
u

rLL+ 1  L
L (c; L;)

+
1
2
(L   )
rLL+ 1  L
L (c; L;)
+
1
2
( ) c+ 1
2
(HL+ (1  L)) :
4.3 Equilibrium
Using the expressions for expected utility derived in the previous subsection, expected utility
as a function of the equilibrium , and of the banks choices (c; L), is given by
EU (c; L;) =
8>>><>>>:
EUNL (c; L;) if L (c; L;) c  1  L
EUPL (c; L;) if 1  L < L (c; L;) c  1  L+ rLL
EUB (c; L;) if 1  L+ rLL < L (c; L;) c:
Since the bank maximizes the depositorsexpected utility, the banks choices potentially
depend on its beliefs over how depositors will coordinate on equilibria, i.e., on the sunspot
equilibrium the bank anticipates depositors will play. For example, the bank can be opti-
mistic and think that depositors will always coordinate in the Pareto dominant equilibrium.
Alternatively, it can be pessimistic and assume that depositors will coordinate on the worst
equilibrium possible. The bank´s beliefs may also be equal to any other probability distrib-
ution over these equilibria and any other equilibrium that can occur.
Recall that A (c; L) is the set of all strategy proles  that are equilibria in the with-
drawing game given (c; L).
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Denition 3 A set of beliefs  for the bank is a probability density function (c;L) : A (c; L)!
[0;+1) for each pair (c; L) 2 R+  [0; 1] :
IfA (c; L) is not a singleton there is a continuum of possible functions (c;L), and therefore,
there are many possible sets of beliefs for the bank. Given a set of beliefs , the bank
chooses (c; L) to maximize depositorsexpected utility and, therefore, the choice of (c; L)
might depend on the set of beliefs the bank has.
Denition 4 An equilibrium in this model is a pair (co; Lo) 2 R+  [0; 1], beliefs for the
bank, , and a probability density function over A (co; Lo), f , such that:
(i) (co; Lo) solves
max
(c;L)2R+[0;1]
Z
A(c;L)
(c;L) ()EU (c; L;) d;
(ii) f is a sunspot equilibrium in the withdrawal game induced by (co; Lo) ; and
(iii) f = (co;Lo).
Condition (i) requires that (co; Lo) solve the banks problem given the set of beliefs
. Condition (ii) requires that an equilibrium is played in the withdrawal game. Finally,
condition (iii) imposes consistency between the banks beliefs and the sunspot equilibrium
played by depositors in the withdrawal game induced by (c0; L0).
5 Fragility
The constrained e¢ cient allocation can only be attained in an equilibrium in which only early
consumers withdraw at t = 1. Otherwise, since ce = 1   L, some of the long-term asset
would need to be liquidated early to pay all early withdrawers and cl (L) < cl (L) : This
implies that to achieve the constrained e¢ cient allocation in a decentralized equilibrium, the
constrained e¢ cient allocation has to be incentive compatible, i.e., late consumers have to
be willing to wait and withdraw in the second period for whatever signal they get.
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Denition 5 An allocation (c1; c2 ()) is incentive compatible i¤
c1  Ep (c2 ()j i) for i = L;H: (2)
where Ep (c2 ()j i) = pc2 (i) + (1  p) c2 (j), i; j = L;H, i 6= j.
The set of incentive compatible allocations depends on the level of transparency of the
economy, p, through the expectation operator Ep. Moreover, the more transparent the
economy the smaller the set of incentive compatible allocations. It is easier to satisfy an
ex-ante incentive compatibility constraint than state by state ones. When p = 0:5, private
signals do not reveal any new information to depositors and an allocation needs to satisfy a
unique ex-ante incentive compatibility constraint to be incentive compatible. As the level of
transparency increases, the conditions in (2) resemble state by state incentive compatibility
constraints more and more, reducing the set of incentive compatible allocations.
Proposition 2 The constrained e¢ cient allocation is incentive compatible if and only if
p  H (1  c
e)  (1  ) ce
(H   L) (1  ce)  bp:
Proposition 2 states that if the precision of the private signal is low enough (p  bp) there
exists an equilibrium in the withdrawal game given (ce; L) in which only early consumers
withdraw early, and, therefore, the constrained e¢ cient allocation can be achieved in a
decentralized equilibrium. The constrained e¢ cient welfare can only be attained in economies
in which transparency is low. This, however, does not imply that the constrained e¢ cient
welfare will always be attained: in order to strictly implement the constrained e¢ cient
allocation it must be the case that there is a unique equilibrium in the withdrawal game
induced by (ce; L).
There are many denitions of fragility in the banking literature. I will follow Keister
(2012) and say that the economy is fragile if there is an equilibrium in which some late
consumers withdraw early, i.e., when a bank run (partial or total) in some state  is part of
an equilibrium in the withdrawal game.
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Denition 6 The economy is fragile if for some equilibrium of the model (c; L;;f) there
exists an equilibrium in the subsequent withdrawal game in which some late consumers with-
draw early with positive probability.
The denition of fragility presented in this section says that if, for all sets of equilibrium
beliefs , the bank chooses a pair (c; L) such that the equilibrium of the withdrawal game
is unique and no late consumers withdraw early in it, then the economy is not fragile. If
the economy is not fragile, a solvent bank is not susceptible to bank runs and there are no
expectation-driven equilibria.
In terms of fragility, for the constrained e¢ cient allocation to be attained for any set
of beliefs for the bank, (ce; L) has to be incentive compatible in an economy that is not
fragile. As the following proposition shows, this will be the case when transparency is low
enough.
Proposition 3 There exists p  p^ 2 (0:5; 1) such that the bank chooses (ce; L) (for all
possible beliefs ) and the economy is not fragile if and only if p < p.
When p < p, the constrained e¢ cient allocation is the unique equilibrium allocation of
the model. For all possible beliefs , the bank chooses (ce; L) and only early consumers
withdraw early in the subsequent withdrawal game, i.e., A (ce; L) = f = f0; 0gg. Con-
sider the withdrawal game given (ce; L) and suppose p^ > 0:5. Recall from section 4 that
coordination motives are only present when the state is low. As discussed above, the absence
of liquidation costs in the high state implies that if depositors could observe the state per-
fectly they would always have a dominant strategy, and the equilibrium would be unique if
the high state was realized. In particular, if c < HL+ (1  L) late-consumers would always
choose to withdraw late if they observed H . When signals are not perfectly informative,
depositors will make their withdrawal decision contingent on their information, weighting
the expected gains and losses from their action in both states of the world. If late-consumers
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with low signals assign enough weight to the high state, they will choose not to run regardless
of the actions of others, and the equilibrium of the withdrawal game will be unique. This
happens when p < p.
When p > p late consumers with low signals assign enough probability to the low
state happening such that coordination motives become relevant. In this case, incentives
to withdraw early become stronger and may even lead to late consumers with high signals
withdrawing early. On one hand, an increase in the transparency level, p, increases the
weight late-consumers with high signals assign to the high state. This e¤ect decreases their
incentives to run. On the other hand, when p > p, late-consumers with low signals have
more incentives to run which may lead to larger losses of waiting to withdraw if the low state
is realized. This e¤ect increases the incentives to withdraw early. Whether late-consumers
with high signals withdraw early will depend on which of these two e¤ects is stronger, which
in turn depends on their beliefs about what other depositors will do. In any event, increasing
the precision of information above p gives rise to coordination motives that would otherwise
be inexistent, and may prevent the constrained e¢ cient level of welfare from being attained.
Assume a planner who cannot control the banks beliefs over what depositors will do,
nor which equilibrium depositors will play. Then, from this planners point of view, the
safest transparency level would be some p < p. If p < p, the equilibrium allocation is
guaranteed to be constrained e¢ cient and the probability of bank runs is 0. Any other level
of transparency is risky since the equilibrium played may involve bank runs and, therefore,
expected utility may be below the constrained e¢ cient level. Increasing information on the
value of the banks assets can decrease the maximum level of expected utility that can be
attained in equilibria but it may also make the economy fragile. If this was the case, even if
the constrained e¢ cient allocation was attainable it might not be attained in equilibrium.12
12See Bouvard et al. (2014) for a theory of optimal transparency policy.
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5.1 Fragility and Liquidation Costs
As in the standard Diamond and Dybvig model, the strategic complementarities in the with-
drawal game arise from the liquidation costs in the low state. As discussed in section 2:1, the
asset structure captures the re sales that occur when banks are forced to sell a large fraction
of their assets. These re sales are not unique to the banking industry. Whenever there is
a maturity mismatch between the assets and liabilities held by the nancial intermediaries,
as is the case for money market funds and mutual funds, there is potential for strategic
complementarities to arise (Chen et al. (2010) show evidence of these complementarities).
Especially if one considers that the redemption of liabilities can imply the liquidation of long
term assets at re sale prices. In sum, the strategic complementarities described in the paper
can be present whenever there are liquidation costs associated with meeting the redemption
of short term liabilities.
As the following proposition shows, the larger the liquidation costs, the stronger the
depositorsincentives to coordinate and the larger the strategic complementarities. These
stronger strategic complementarities imply that it is harder to support the constraint e¢ cient
allocation as the unique equilibrium: the set of transparency levels such that second best
e¢ ciency is attained shrinks with the liquidation cost of the asset. Moreover, the likelihood
that the economy is fragile for a given transparency level increases with the liquidation cost.
Proposition 4 The threshold p is increasing in r.
The proof follows from the characterization of p in the appendix using the implicit
function theorem.
5.2 Optimistic Bank
To illustrate the e¤ects of transparency on the banks portfolio choices, I focus on an opti-
mistic bank. However, all the results will hold qualitatively if a bank held other beliefs.
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Assume that the bank is optimistic, that is, that for any deposit contract and portfolio in
the banks choice set such that there are multiple equilibria, the bank thinks that depositors
will coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. In order to characterize the choice of
an optimistic bank, one needs to characterize the optimistic banks beliefs by ranking the
possible equilibria for each pair (c; L).
For a given pair (c; L) there may be two di¤erent types of multiplicity: within the same
regime and across regimes. The following propositions ranks equilibria within the same
regime and across regimes.
Proposition 5 Take a pair (c; L) in which there are multiple equilibria within the same
regime. Then, expected utility is (weakly) higher in the equilibrium with the lowest fraction
of early withdrawers.
Proposition 6 For a given pair (c; L)
EUNL
 
c; L;NL

> max

EUPL
 
c; L;PL

; EUB
 
c; L;B
	
where j is any withdrawing strategy such that, given (c; L) the bank is in regime j in the
low state.
In the no liquidation regime no long term asset is liquidated early and all early withdraw-
ers get the promised amount. Conversely, in the partial liquidation and bankruptcy regimes
some or all of the long term asset is liquidated early and early withdrawers might get less
than what they were promised. Hence, expected utility is higher under the no liquidation
regime.
With these propositions in mind, and using the characterization of equilibria in the
appendix, one can characterize the beliefs of an optimistic bank. These are depicted in
gure 3. For those pairs (c; L) in region 1, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is a no run
equilibrium. If the no run equilibrium will be played, the bank will be in the no liquidation
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regime in region 1a, in the partial liquidation regime in region 1b, and in region 1c the
bank will be bankrupt if the low state is realized. In region 2, an optimistic bank assigns
probability 1 to the equilibrium in which all late consumers with low signals withdraw early.
In region 2a, the amount of liquidity held by the bank, 1   L, is enough to pay all early
withdrawers without liquidating any long term asset (no liquidation regime). In region 2b,
the bank will be in the partial liquidation regime if the low state is realized and the best
equilibrium is played. In region 3, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is such that the bank
will be bankrupt if the low state is realized. Finally, in region 4, c > HL + (1  L) and
withdrawing early is a dominant strategy for all depositors.
As Cooper and Ross (1998), and Ennis and Keister (2006) point out there are two reasons
why a bank may choose to hold excess liquidity when the liquidation of long term assets is
costly. Holding liquid assets minimizes the liquidation costs if a run were to occur; and it
may decrease the incentives of late consumers to run.13
If the bank chooses to be in the no liquidation region, then he will always choose Lc =
(1  L). Otherwise, he could always increase expected welfare by increasing L since E () >
1. In the partial liquidation region, if L is xed, a bank will always choose Lc = (1  L) :
In this case, it is too costly to liquidate long term assets to pay late consumers who withdraw
early: for each unit of consumption paid to a late consumer withdrawing early in the low
state, late consumers withdrawing late would lose 1=r . Suppose that Lc > (1  L) :Then,
by increasing the amount of short term asset by , late consumers would lose (H   1) 
in the high state but they would gain
 
1
r
  L

 in the low state. Since E (r ()) < 1, the
bank would be better o¤ decreasing L and choosing Lc = (1  L).
If a bank chooses to avoid bankruptcy, he will only hold excess liquidity if he expects
a partial run to occur in the low state. In this case, having some excess liquidity (i.e.,
13In constrast to Cooper and Ross (1998), and Ennis and Keister (2006) I do not allow for multiple
equilibria in my analysis in this section. I focus on the best equilibrium being played. Nevertheless, the
occurrence of bank runs is random and depends on the low state being realized.
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Figure 3: Beliefs of an optimistic bank. The best equilibrium in region 1 is a no-run
equilibrium. The bank will be in the NL regime in region 1a, in the PL in region 1b, and
in the bankruptcy regime in region 1c: In region 2, the best equilibrium is the one in which
only late consumers with low signals withdraw early. In region 2a the bank will be in the
NL regime and in region 2b in the PL regime. In region 3 the best equilibrium implies the
bank will be bankrupt if the low state is realized. Finally, in region 4, withdrawing early is
a dominant strategy for all depositors since c > LL+ (1  L) :
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c < 1   L) helps the bank avoid liquidation costs in the event of a run, and deters late
consumers with high signals from withdrawing early. If a bank chooses to be in a no-run
region and avoid bankruptcy, he will not hold any excess liquidity.14
Proposition 7 There exists a threshold p > p^ such that for all p 2 1
2
; p

an optimistic bank
chooses an allocation that is run-proof and holds no excess liquidity in equilibrium.
The proof of this proposition follows from lemmas 4 and 5, and the characterization of
equilibria in the appendix. Suppose that a bank always chooses to avoid bankruptcy. Then,
the decision to hold excess liquidity in equilibrium, will depend on the transparency level
of the economy. When p < p^, the constrained e¢ cient level of welfare can be attained in
equilibrium and the bank will not hold excess liquidity. For transparency levels higher than
p^, the constrained e¢ cient allocation is no longer incentive compatible and the maximum
expected utility that can be attained is less than EU. If p 2 (p^; p), the bank chooses a no-
run equilibrium and does not hold excess liquidity. For p > p, preventing bank runs becomes
too costly in terms of forgone risk sharing: the amount of consumption that needs to be
promised to early withdrawers that deters late consumers with low signals from withdrawing
early is too low. In this case, the bank is better o¤ choosing a pair (c; L) in the partial run
region and giving early consumers a higher consumption.15
The choices of this optimistic bank give an upper bound to the expected utility that can
be attained in equilibrium for di¤erent transparency levels. Figure 4 shows the supremum
for the set of attainable expected utility in equilibrium.
14Ennis and Keister (2006) nd that, in a model with liquidation costs and without uncertainty, depositors
with preferences given by c=;  2 (0; 1), a bank will never hold excess liquidity to mitigate the e¤ects of
a potential run. Ratnovski (2013) analyzes transparency as a substitute to liquidity holdings.
15These qualitative results do not depend on the bank being optimistic. The incentives of non optimisitc
banks to hold excess liquidity will be even higher since they assign a higher probability to bank-runs occurring.
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Figure 4: Maximum attainable expected utility in equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
There are many dimensions in which a nancial institution can be transparent. For example,
banks can be transparent about their liquidity holdings, their capital structure, and even
the of stress tests. In this paper I highlight a novel channel through which transparency
can be costly for nancial institutions by focusing on the transparency about the value of
assets. In the presence of strategic complementarities, increasing the precision of the private
information depositors have about the value of the assets of a bank decreases welfare by
reducing the amount of risk sharing in the economy and by increasing the banks vulnerability
to runs.
When the transparency level is low, depositors cannot distinguish low states from high
states based on their own signals, and, unless they are hit with a liquidity shock, they
have few incentives to withdraw early. In this case, they do not act on their information and
there are no bank runs in equilibrium. As the transparency level increases, the private signals
become more informative and the incentives to withdraw early become stronger, giving rise
to equilibria with bank runs. As transparency and coordination motives increase, the set
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of incentive compatible allocations from which the bank can choose shrinks and it becomes
costlier for the bank to choose a portfolio and a deposit contract such that there will be
no runs. For low enough levels of transparency the second best allocation is attained in
equilibrium. However, when transparency is high enough, the bank chooses to hold excess
liquidity and forgo return in order to deter some depositors from running and to minimize
the costs of ine¢ cient bank runs.
The mechanism described in the paper relies on the strategic complementarities that
arise in the model due to the maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities and on the
liquidation costs implied by the early liquidation of long term assets. This feature is not
unique to banks: the mechanism is also particularly relevant for intermediaries that hold
assets for which there are no market quotations and in which the liquidation of assets is
costly, such as money market funds and some open-ended mutual funds. These nancial
intermediaries hold portfolios that are not perfectly liquid and their shareholders can redeem
their shares on demand daily. In fact, the asset classes in which money market funds trade
are usually subject to re sales if not held to maturity. As the paper shows, increasing
transparency about the value of the assets held by these nancial intermediaries can increase
the coordination motives between investors and, thus, these institutions vulnerability to
runs.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Private signals and public information
One can decompose the private signal received by depositor h as
eh = v + sh
where v 2 fH ; Lg with Pr (v = ij = i) = pv and shi 2 f0; j   vg with
Pr
 
shi = 0jv = i

= ps > 0:5. v is the common component of the private signals and
can be interpreted as public information. sh is an idiosyncratic shock and it implies some
people will make mistakes even after observing the signal v. Then,
Pr
eh = ij = i = Pr  v = i; sh = 0j = i+ Pr  v = j; sh = i   jj = i
= pvps + (1  pv) (1  ps)
Let p := pvps + (1  pv) (1  ps). Then, an increase in the precision of public information pv
translates directly to an increase in the precision of the private signal p.
7.2 Constrained e¢ cient allocation
Lemma 1 The planner will choose not to hold excess liquidity. Moreover, the planner will
choose to hold just enough liquidity to pay early consumers, i.e., ce = 1  L:
Proof. Recall that E () > 1 and rL < 1, H   1 + rL 1r < 0. Suppose that ce > 1   L.
In this case, the planner could increase welfare by decreasing L. Since H   1 + rL 1r < 0,
decreasing L would increase the amount of expected resources available at t = 2 and expected
welfare. Alternatively, if ce < 1   L, the planner could increase the objective function by
increasing L. Since E () > 1, increasing L would increase the expected resources available
in period 2 and therefore increase aggregate expected welfare.
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7.3 Benet from withdrawing early
Lemma 3 If c < HL+ (1  L),  (H ;)  0 implies  (L;) > 0.
Proof. When c < HL + (1  L), h (H ;) < 0 for all . Then, if  (H ;)  0 it must
be that h (L;) > 0. Since p > 12 ,  (L;) puts more weight on h (L;) than h (H ;).
Therefore, if  (H ;)  0 it must be the case that  (L;) > 0.
Corollary 2 1 In equilibrium, L  H , with strict inequality if i 2 (0; 1) i = 1; 2:
Proof. To have L 2 (0; 1) and H 2 (0; 1) in equilibrium it must be that
 (H ; fL; Hg) = 0 and  (L; fL; Hg) = 0: (3)
But from the lemma I know that  (H ; fL; Hg) = 0 implies  (L; fL; Hg) > 0. There-
fore, (3) can never hold.
Assume L < H in equilibrium. From the rst part of this proof, only two cases are possible:
(i) L = 0 and H 2 (0; 1] ; and (ii) L = [0; 1) and H = 1. To be in case (i) it must be the
case that  (H ; fL; Hg) = 0 and  (L; fL; Hg) < 0 which contradicts the lemma. For
case (ii)  (H ; fL; Hg) > 0 and  (L; fL; Hg) = 0 have to hold, which also contradicts
the lemma. Then, there cant be an equilibrium in which L < H :
Finally, from the rst part of this proof, if L = H =  it must be that  2 f0; 1g.
7.4 Equilibrium determination
I will only consider (c; L) 2 R+ [0; 1] but I will omit this for notation simplicity. LetWR be
the set of all pairs (c; L) such that  is an equilibrium in regime R in the withdrawing game.
Corollary 1 shows that there can be ve di¤erent kinds of equilibria in the withdrawal game:
(1) L = H = 1 and  (L; f1; 1g)  0 and  (H ; f1; 1g)  0, (2) L = 1, 1 > H > 0 and
 (L; f1; Hg)  0 and  (H ; f1; Hg) = 0, (3) L = 1, H = 0 and  (L; f1; 0g)  0 and
 (H ; f1; 0g)  0, (4) 1 > L > 0, H = 0 and  (L; fL; 0g) = 0 and  (H ; fL; 0g)  0,
and (5) L = H = 0 and  (L; f0; 0g)  0 and  (H ; f0; 0g)  0 .
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7.4.1 Everybody withdraws early
If L = H = 1 is an equilibrium, I must have  (H ; f1; 1g)  0. This means, that L =
H = 1 can only be an equilibrium when c  1 L+RH . If c < 1 L+RH ,  (H ; f1; 1g) =
 1. Since there is always something left to withdraw in the second period even if everyone
chooses to withdraw in the rst one, and each consumer has measure 0, the benet of
withdrawing early in this case is negative and equal to  1: Moreover, I know that if c 
1   L + RH withdrawing early is a dominant strategy. Therefore, in this region there is a
unique equilibrium. If L = H = 1 is an equilibrium I have bankruptcy in both states. From
now on consider the case in which c < 1  L + RH . In this area there is never bankruptcy
in the high state.
7.4.2 No late consumer withdraws early
To have L = H = 0 an equilibrium I must have  (; f0; 0g) < 0 for  = L; H , i.e., the
expected benet of withdrawing early has to be negative for any signal received.
From Lemma 1, I know that  (L; f0; 0g)  0 implies  (H ; f0; 0g) < 0. Therefore it is
enough to nd all (c; L) such that  (L; f0; 0g)  0:
There are 3 cases:
1. No liquidation
c  p(LL+ (1  L)  c)
1     (1  p)
(H + (1  L)  c)
1    0
which gives
c  L (pL + (1  p) H) + (1  L)
and WNLf0;0g = f(c; L) : c  L (pL + (1  p) H) + (1  L) and c  (1  L)g :
2. Partial Liquidation
c  p

L

L+ [(1  L)  c] 1
rL

1     (1  p)
(H + (1  L)  c)
1    0
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or rewriting this expression
c  (pL + (1  p) H)L+ (1  L)
 
p1
r
+ (1  p) 
1    1   p1
r
+ (1  p) :
Then, W PLf0;0g =
(c; L) : c  (pL+(1 p)H)L+(1 L)(p
1
r
+(1 p))
(1 (1 (p 1r+(1 p))))
and 1  L < c < 1  L+ rLL

:
3. Bankruptcy
p
1  L+ rLL

+ (1  p)

c  (H + (1  L)  c)
1  

 0
or
c  (H + (1  L))  p
(1  p)
(1  )

(1  L+ rLL) :
Thus,WBf0;0g =
n
(c; L) : c  (H+(1 L) c)
1    p(1 p) 1 L+rLL and c  1  L+ rLL
o
:
7.4.3 Only late consumers with low signals withdraw
There are 2 cases in which only late consumers with low signals withdraw early: they can
be indi¤erent between doing so and waiting or they might strictly prefer it.
To have L 2 (0; 1) H = 0 an equilibrium it must be that
 (L; fL; 0g) = 0 and  (H ; fL; 0g) < 0:
From lemma 1 it is enough to check that  (L; fL; 0g) = 0.
1. No liquidation
c = p

LL+ (1  L)  Lc
1  L

+ (1  p)

HL+ (1  L)  Hc
1  H

:
Using the denition of L
c =

pL (1  (1  p)L) + (1  p) H (1  pL)
(1  2pL (1  p))

L+ (1  L) :
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The right hand side of this equality is decreasing in L and if (+ (1  ) pL) c <
1  L, c < (1  L) : Therefore, WNLfL;0g =8<: (c; L) : c =

pL(1 (1 p)L)+(1 p)H(1 pL)
(1 2pL(1 p))

L+ (1  L)
and (+ (1  ) pL) c < 1  L
9=;
and WNLfL;0g  WNLf0;0g.
2. Partial liquidation
c = p

LL+
1
r
(1  L)  1
r
Lc
1  L

+ (1  p)

HL+ (1  L)  Hc
1  H

:
Using the denition of L and H
c =
(pL(1 H)+(1 p)H(1 L))L+[(1 )+( 1r 1)p ( 1r+1)p(1 p)L](1 L)
(1 )(1+( 1r 1)p(1 L) ( 1r 1)(1 )(1 p)p22L p(2 p(1+ 1r ))L)
(4)
Therefore, W PLfL;0g = f(c; L) : (4) holds and 1  L < Lc < 1  L+ rLLg
Moreover, it can be show that
D[
L2[0;1]
W PLfL;0g =

(c; L) : c  (1  p)
(1   (2p  1)) ((rL + H)L+ 2 (1  L))

\
(c; L) : c  ((1 )(p
2L+(1 p)2H)L+((1 )+( 1r 1)p ( 1r+1)(1 p)p)(1 L))
((1 )(1 ( 1r 1)(1 )(1 p)p2 p(2 p(1+ 1r ))))

\
(c; L) : c  ((H+L)L+(
1
r
+1)(1 L))
((1 )(1 p)(1  1r )+(1+ 1r ))

\
f(c; L) : c  bc (L)g
where bc (L) is dened by:
bc (L)
0@ (2 (1  p) (1 + ) + (1  )) (1  L)
+ (E () 2 (1  p) + (1  ) (pL + (1  p) H))L
1A
= (1  L) (2 (1  p) (1 + L (E ()  1))) + bc (L)2 (2 (1  p)+ (1  )) : (5)
40
3. Bankruptcy
p
rLL+ (1  L)
L
+ (1  p)

c  HL+ (1  L)  Hc
1  H

= 0
which can be rewritten as
c = HL+ (1  L)  p (1  H)
(1  p)L
(rLL+ (1  L)) :
Thus, WBfL;0g =
(c; L) : c = HL+ (1  L)  p (1  H)
(1  p)L
(rLL+ (1  L)) and Lc  1  L+ rLL

:
It can be shown that
D[
L2[0;1]
WBfL;0g =

(c; L) : c  (1  p)
1   (2p  1) ((H + Lr)L+ 2 (1  L))

\

(c; L) : c  (HL+ 1  L)  (1  ) p
(1  p) (rLL+ 1  L)

\

(c; L) : c  (HL+ 1  L)  p
2 (1  )
(1  p) ((1  ) p+ ) (rLL+ 1  L)

:
To have L = 1 H = 0 in equilibrium it must be that
 (L; f1; 0g) > 0 >  (H ; f1; 0g) :
1. No liquidation
c  1
2
[L + H ]L+ (1  L)
and
c 
 
p2L + (1  p)2 H
(1  2p (1  p))
!
L+ (1  L) :
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Then, WNLf1;0g =8<: (c; L) :

p2L+(1 p)2H
(1 2p(1 p))

L+ (1  L) < c < 1
2
[L + H ]L+ (1  L)
and (+ (1  ) p) c < 1  L
9=; :
Since p > 1
2
, WNLf1;0g 6= ?.
2. Partial Liquidation
c 

(1  ) (1  p)

1  1
r

+ 1 +
1
r
 1 
(L + H)L+

1
r
+ 1

(1  L)

(6)
and
c 
 
(1  )  p2L + (1  p)2 HL+ (1  ) +  1r   1 p   1r + 1 p (1  p) (1  L)
(1  )  1   1
r
  1 (1  ) (1  p) p2   p  2  p  1 + 1
r
 :
(7)
W PLf1;0g = f(c; L) : s.t. (6) ; (7) and 1  L < Lc < 1  L+ rLLg :
3. Bankruptcy
c  HL+ (1  L)  p (1  H)
(1  p)L
(rLL+ (1  L))
c  HL+ (1  L)  (1  p) (1  H)
pL
(rLL+ (1  L)) :
Then,
WBf1;0g =
8<: (c; L) : Lc  1  L+ rLL , andp(1 H)
(1 p)L >
c (1 L) HL
(rLL+(1 L)) >
(1 p)(1 H)
pL
9=;
:
Since p > 1
2
, WBf1;0g is non-empty:
7.4.4 Late consumers with low signals withdraw for sure, high signals mix
To have L = 1 H 2 (0; 1) in equilibrium
 (L; f1; Hg) > 0 and  (H ; f1; Hg) = 0
must hold. Using lemma 1, it is enough to check that  (H ; fL; 0g) = 0.
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1. No liquidation
c = (1  p) LL+ (1  L)  Lc
1  L
+ p
HL+ (1  L)  Hc
1  H
:
Using the denitions of L and H
c = [(1  p) L + pH ]L+ (1  L) :
Thus,
WNLf1;Hg =
8<: (c; L) : c = 12 [(1  p) L + pH ]L+ (1  L)and (+ (1  ) pL) c < 1  L
9=; :
2. Partial Liquidation
c = (1  p)

LL+
1
r
(1  L)  1
r
Lc
1  L

+ p

HL+ (1  L)  Hc
1  H

c = (1  p)

LL+
1
r
(1  L)  1
r
Lc
(1  ) (1  H)

+ p

HL+ (1  L)  Hc
(1  ) (1  H)

c =
((1  p) L + pH)L+
 
1
r
+ 1

(1  L) 
(1  ) (1  H) (1  p)
 
1  1
r

+ 1 + 1
r
 :
Then, W PLf1;Hg =
W PLf1;Hg =
8<: (c; L) : c =
((1 p)L+pH)L+( 1r+1)(1 L)
((1 )(1 H)(1 p)(1  1r )+1+ 1r )
and 1  L < Lc < 1  L+ rLL
9=;
:
It can be shown that
D[
H2[0;1]
W PLf1;Hg =

(c; L) : c  (H + rL)L+ 2 (1  L)
2

\

(c; L) : c  (H + L)L+ 2 (1  L)
2

\
(
(c; L) : c 
 
(H + L)L+
 
1
r
+ 1

(1  L) 
(1  ) (1  p)  1  1
r

+
 
1 + 1
r
) :
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3. Bankruptcy
c = HL+ (1  L)  (1  p) (1  H)
pL
(rLL+ (1  L))
c = HL+ (1  L)  (1  p) (1  ) p (1  H)
p (+ (1  ) (p+ (1  p)H)) (rLL+ (1  L)) :
WBf1;Hg =
8<: (c; L) : Lc  1  L+ rLL andc = RHL+ (1  L)  (1 p)(1 )p(1 H)p(1 (1 )(1 p)(1 H)) (rLL+ (1  L))
9=; :
Moreover, it can be shown that
D[
H2[0;1]
WBf1;Hg =

(c; L) : c  (H + rL)L+ 2 (1  L)
2

\f(c; L) : c  (HL+ (2 (1  p)  (1  2p)) (1  L))  rLL (1  p) (1  )g
\ f(c; L) : c  HL+ 1  Lg :
7.5 Regimes and Multiplicity
Given the sets characterized in the previous region, I can characterize the sets of pairs
(c; L) 2 R+  [0; 1] in which no liquidation, partial liquidation and bankruptcy happen
equilibrium. Let SR be the set of all pairs (c; L) such that an equilibrium in regime R exists:
SNL = WNLf0;0g [
[
L
WNLfL;0g [WNLf1;0g [
[
H
WNLf1;Hg;
SPL = W PLf0;0g [
[
L
W PLfL;0g [W PLf1;0g [
[
H
W PLf1;Hg;
SB = WBf0;0g
D[
[
L
WBfL;0g
D[WBf1;0g
D[
[
H
WBf1;Hg:
As I pointed out before, there exist two di¤erent kind of multiplicity of equilibria: across
regimes and within regime:The rest of this section characterizes these and shows that the
two kinds of multiplicity always arise.
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7.5.1 Across Regimes
Proposition 8 There exists a set MAR  R+  [0; 1] ; MAR 6= ? such that for all (c; L) 2
MAR there are multiple equilibria across regimes.
Proof. To prove this statement it is enough to show that for all parameter values, there
exists at least one pair (c; L) for which there are equilibria in di¤erent regimes. I will show
that
SNL \ SB 6= ?:
Take (c0; L0) such that c0 = 12 [L + H ]L0 + (1  L0) and (+ (1  ) p) c0  1   L0: It is
easy to see that (c0; L0) 2 SNL.
Moreover, since 0 < r < 1,
c0 >
(H + rL)L0
2
+ (1  L0)
and
c <
1  L+ rLL
+ (1  ) p :
Therefore, (c0; L0) 2 SB.
7.5.2 No Liquidation
Proposition 9 There is multiplicity of equilibria within the no liquidation regime:
(i) WNLfL;0g  WNLf0;0g for all L 2 [0; 1] ;
(ii) WNLf1;Hg  WNLf1;0g for all H 2 [0; 1] ;
(iii) WNLf1;0g \WNLf0;0g 6= ?:
Proof. (i)We know that
WNLf0;0g = f(c; L) : c  L (pL + (1  p) H) + (1  L) and c  (1  L)g
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and WNLfL;0g = 8<: (c; L) : c =

pL(1 (1 p)L)+(1 p)H(1 pL)
(1 2pL(1 p))

L+ (1  L)
and (+ (1  ) pL) c  1  L
9=; :
Take any L 2 [0; 1]. Let (c0; L0) 2 WNLfL;0g. Then,
c0 =

pL (1  (1  p)L) + (1  p) H (1  pL)
(1  2pL (1  p))

L0 + (1  L0)
and
c0  (+ (1  ) pL) c0  1  L0:
Since f (L) 

pL(1 (1 p)L)+(1 p)H(1 pL)
(1 2pL(1 p))

is decreasing in L and f (0) =
(pL + (1  p) H),
c0  L0 (pL + (1  p) H) + (1  L0) :
Therefore, (c0; L0) 2 WNLf0;0g. Since L was chosen arbitrarily in (0; 1)
WNLfL;0g  WNLf0;0g for all L 2 [0; 1] :
(ii) We know that WNLf1;0g =8<: (c; L) :

p2L+(1 p)2H
(1 2p(1 p))

L+ (1  L)  c  1
2
[L + H ]L+ (1  L)
and (+ (1  ) p) c  1  L
9=;
and
WNLf1;Hg =
8<: (c; L) : c = 12 [L + H ]L+ (1  L)and (+ (1  ) (p+ (1  p)H)) c  1  L
9=; :
Take H 2 [0; 1]. Let (c1; L1) 2 WNLf1;Hg: Then,
c1 =
1
2
[L + H ]RL1 + (1  L1)
and
(+ (1  ) p) c1  (+ (1  ) (p+ (1  p)H)) c1  1  L1:
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Therefore, (c 1; L1) 2 WNLf1;0g.
(iii) WNLf1;0g \WNLf0;0g =8<: (c; L) :

p2L+(1 p)2H
(1 2p(1 p))

L+ (1  L)  c  L (pL + (1  p) H) + (1  L)
and (+ (1  ) p) c  1  L
9=; 6= ?
since
(pL + (1  p) H) < 1
2
[L + H ]
given p > 0:5 and L < H and 
p2L + (1  p)2 H
(1  2p (1  p))
!
L+ (1  L) > 0 8L 2 [0; 1] :
The next corollary follows from (i) and (ii) in the proposition above.
Corollary 3 The set of pairs (c; L) 2 R+ [0; 1] such that there exists an equilibrium in the
no liquidation regime is given by
SNL = WNLf0;0g [WNLf1;0g
which can be rewritten as
SNL =

(c; L) : c <
1
2
[L + H ]L+ (1  L) and (+ (1  ) p) c  1  L

[f(c; L) : c  L (pL + (1  p) H) + (1  L) and c  (1  L)g :
From the proposition above I can characterize the within regime multiplicity set in the case
of no liquidation. The following corollary does so formally.
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Corollary 4 For all (c; L) 2MNL 6= ? there are multiple equilibria within the no liquidation
regime, where
MNL =
[
L
WNLfL;0g [
[
H
WNLf1;Hg
MNL =
8<: (c; L) : c  bc (L) andp2L+(1 p)2H
(1 2p(1 p))

L+ (1  L)  c  L (pL + (1  p) H) + (1  L)
9=;
[

(c; L) : c =
1
2
[L + H ]L+ (1  L) & (+ (1  ) p) c  1  L

and bc (L) is given by (5) :
Proof. Using the characterization of the sets in this appendix I get
WNLf1;0g \WNLf0;0g 
[
L
WNLfL;0g:
Therefore,
[
L
WNLfL;0g [
[
H
WNLf1;Hg characterizes the set where there is multiple equilibria
within the no liquidation regime.
Moreover,

(c; L) : c = 1
2
[L + H ]RL+ (1  L) and (+ (1  ) p) c  1  L
	 6= ? and
M 6= ?.
7.5.3 Partial Liquidation
Proposition 10 For all (c; L) 2MPL, there are multiple equilibria within the partial liqui-
dation regime where
MPL =
([
L
W PLfL;0g \W PLf0;0g
)
[
([
L
W PLfL;0g \W PLf1;0g
)
[
([
H
W PLf1;Hg \W PLf1;0g
)
:
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Proof. Let
ecL (L)  ((pL(1 H)+(1 p)H(1 L))L+[(1 )1+( 1r 1)p ( 1r+1)p(1 p)L](1 L))[(1 )(1+( 1r 1)p(1 L) ( 1r 1)(1 )(1 p)p22L p(2 p(1+ 1r ))L)]
and
cL (L) 
(L + H)L+
 
1
r
+ 1

(1  L) 
(1  ) (1  H) (1  p)
 
1  1
r

+ 1 + 1
r
 :
Using the characterization of the sets in this appendix I get[
H
W PLfL;0g \W PLf0;0g =

(c; L) : max

1  L

;
1  p
1   (2p  1) (H + rL)L+ 2 (1  L)

 c  ec0 (L)
[
L
W PLfL;0g \W PLf1;0g =

(c; L) : ec1 (L)  c  minbc (L) ; c0 (L) ; 1  L+ rL
+ (1  ) p

[
H
W PLf1;Hg \W PLf1;0g =

(c; L) : max

1  L
+ (1  ) p;ec1 (L) ; (H + rL)L+ 2 (1  L)2

 c  bc (L)
[
L
W PLf1;Hg \W PLf0;0g = ?[
L
W PLfL;0g \W PLf1;Hg = ?
where bc (L) is dened in (5). Therefore, MPL =([
H
W PLfL;0g \W PLf0;0g
)
[
([
L
W PLfL;0g \W PLf1;0g
)
[
([
H
W PLf1;Hg \W PLf1;0g
)
:
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7.5.4 Bankruptcy
Proposition 11 There is no multiplicity within the bankruptcy regime.
Proof. Let L 2 [0; 1] and (c; L) 2 WBfL;0g. Since HL+ (1  L) 
p(1 H)
(1 p)L (rLL+ (1  L))
is strictly increasing in L, I know that (c; L) =2 WBf0L;0g for 
0
L 2 [0; 1] ; 0L 6= L. Therefore,
WBfL;0g \WBf0L;0g = ? for all L; 
0
L 2 L 6= 0L.
Let H 2 [0; 1] and (c; L) 2 WBf1;Hg. Since HL + (1  L)  
(1 p)(1 )(1 H)
(+(1 )(p+(1 p)H))
(rLL+ (1  L)) is strictly increasing in H , I know that (c; L) =2 WBf1;0Hg for 
0
H 2
[0; 1] ; 0H 6= H . Therefore, WBf1;Hg \WBf1;0Hg = ?.
Finally, since p  0:5, it can be shown that WBfL;0g \WBf1;Hg = ? for all L 2 [0; 1) ; H 2
(0; 1] and therefore there is no multiplicity of equilibria within the bankruptcy regime.
Using the denitions of WB in this appendix, I can show that the set of pairs (c; L) such
that there is an equilibrium in the bankruptcy regime is SB =n
(c; L) : c  (H+rL)L
2
+ (1  L) and c < 1 L+rLL
+(1 )p
o
[n
(c; L) : (1 p)
(1 (2p 1))((H + rL)L+ 2(1  L)) and c  1 L+rLL+(1 )p
o
[n
(c; L) : c  (H + (1  L))  p(1 p) (1 ) (1  L+ rLL) and c  1 L+rLL
o
:
7.6 Fragility
Proposition 2 The constrained e¢ cient allocation is incentive compatible if and only if
p  H (1  c
e)  (1  ) ce
(H   L) (1  ce)  bp:
Proof. Since c2 (L) < c2 (H) in the constrained e¢ cient allocation, and p  0:5,
Ep (c2 ()j L)  Ep (c2 ()j H) : Therefore, to show that the constrained e¢ cient alloca-
tion is incentive compatible it is enough to show that late consumers with low signals are
willing to wait and withdraw in the second period. Thus, the constrained e¢ cient allocation
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is incentive compatible i¤
ce  pLL
 + 1  L   ce
1   + (1  p)
HL
 + 1  L   ce
1  
Rewriting this condition gives
p  HL
   ce + (1  L)
(H   L)L =
H (1  ce)  (1  ) ce
(H   L) (1  ce)
For the remainder of the paper, I will assume that u0 1 (Ep ()) = ce 2
L
1+(L 1) ;
Ep()
1+(Ep() 1)

which implies that bp 2  1
2
; 1

.
The set of bank choices such that the economy is fragile is given by
F =
[
L
WNLfL;0g [WNLf1;0g [
[
H
WNLf1;Hg
[
[
L
W PLfL;0g [W PLf1;0g [
[
H
W PLf1;Hg
[
[
L
WBfL;0g [WBf1;0g [
[
H
WBf1;Hg:
Using the characterizations of these sets provided in this appendix I can show that F =8<:(c; L) : c  max
8<: min

H+rL
2
L+ (1  L) ; cf1;0g (L)
	
;
2(1 p)
(1 (2p 1))
 
H+rL
2
L+ (1  L) ; HL+ (1  L)  p1 p (1 ) (rLL+ 1  L)
9=;
9=;
where cf1;0g (L) =
min

((1 )(p2L+(1 p)2H)L+[(1 )+( 1r 1)p ( 1r+1)p(1 p)](1 L))
[(1 )(1 ( 1r 1)(1 )(1 p)p2 p(2 p(1+ 1r )))]
;

p2L+(1 p)2H
(1 2p(1 p))

L+ (1  L)

:
Proposition 3There exists p 2 [0:5; 1] such that if and only if
p < p
the bank chooses the constrained e¢ cient allocation and the economy is not fragile.
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Proof. For (ce; L) to be outside the multiplicity region (and be incentive compatible) I
need
L  bL (p)
where bL (p) = max fL 2 (0; 1) : c = (1  L) = and (c; L) 2 Fg
and F is the set of all pairs (c; L) such that the economy is fragile, i.e., there exists an
equilibrium in which there is a bank-run in some state.
It can be shown that
bL (p) = (1 )(p(1 p)+p3 1r+(1 p)3)
((p2L+(1 p)2H)+(1 )(p(1 p)+p3 1r+(1 p)3))
:
To show this I show that the lowest value of c in the intersection between c = (1  L) =
and F is
c =
((1 )(p2L+(1 p)2H)L+[(1 )+( 1r 1)p ( 1r+1)p(1 p)](1 L))
(1 )(1 ( 1r 1)(1 )(1 p)p2 p(2 p(1+ 1r )))
:
The value of L that corresponds to this value of c is L^ (p) where bL (0:5) 2 (0; 1). Taking deriv-
atives of bL (p) with respect to p, one can show that bL (p) is increasing in p. Therefore, there ex-
ists p 2 [0:5; 1] such that for all p < p; L  bL (p). p is given by p = max f0:5;min f1; p0gg
where p0 is given by L = bL (p0) and if this never happens,
p0 =
8<: 0:5 if L < bL (p) for all p 2 (0; 1)1 if L > bL (p) for all p 2 (0; 1) :
7.7 Optimistic Bank
Proposition 5Take a pair (c; L) in which there are multiple equilibria within the same
regime. Then, expected utility is (weakly) higher in the equilibrium with the lowest fraction
of early withdrawers.
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Proof. If there are multiple equilibria in the no liquidation regime, both equilibria yield the
same expected utility since EUNL is independent of L and H .
In the partial liquidation regime if for a given pair (c; L) there are multiple equilibria, ex-
pected utility is given by
EUPL (c; L) = u (c)  1
2

L

1
r
  1

+ 2

c+
1
2
(L + H)L+
 
1 + 1
r

2
(1  L)
where L di¤ers across the di¤erent equilibria. SinceEU
PL (c; L) is decreasing in L, expected
utility is higher in the equilibrium with the lowest fraction of early withdrawers.
Finally, from proposition (11) in the appendix I know that there is no multiplicity of equilibria
within the bankruptcy regime.
Proposition 5 ranks equilibria within the same regime. The following proposition tells us
that withdrawing strategies in the no liquidation regime yield more expected utility than
withdrawing strategies in any other regime.
Proposition 6For a given pair (c; L)
EUNL
 
c; L;NL

> max

EUPL
 
c; L;PL

; EUB
 
c; L;B
	
where j is any withdrawing strategy such that, given (c; L) the bank is in regime j in the
low state.
Proof. Let Ri be the fraction of early withdrawers in regime R in state i.
(i)EUNL > EUPL
EUNL
 
c; L;NL
  EUPL  c; L;PL = 1  1r
2

(1  L) + 1
2

IL

1
r
  1

c
=
1
2

1
r
  1
 
ILc  (1  L)

> 0
since in insolvency ILc > (1  L)
(ii)EUNL > EUB
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EUB
 
c; L;B

=

2
u (c) +

2
u

rLL+ 1  L
BL

+
1
2
 
BL   
 rLL+ 1  L
BL
+
1
2
( ) c+ 1
2
(HL+ (1  L))
< u (c) +
1
2
 
BL   
 rLL+ 1  L
BL
+
1
2
( ) c+ 1
2
(HL+ (1  L))
< u (c) +
1
2
(rLL+ 1  L)  c+ 1
2
(HL+ (1  L))
< u (c) +
1
2
(LL+ 1  L)  c+ 1
2
(HL+ (1  L)) = EUNL
 
c; L;NL

since rLL+ 1  L < cBL and r < 1.
Putting (i) and (ii) together the proposition is proved.
Lemma 4 An optimistic bank will choose L (c; L;) c = (1  L) in the no liquidation
regime
Proof.
EUNL (c; L;) = u (c)  c+ 1
2
(L + H)L+ (1  L)
is increasing in L for any choice of c: Since in the no liquidation regime L (c; L;) c 
(1  L) , EUNL (c; L;) will be maximized at L (c; L;) c = (1  L).
Lemma 5 The best equilibrium within the partial liquidation regime implies L (c; L;) c =
(1  L) if @L(;c;L)
@L
= 0
Proof.
EUPL (c; L;) = u (c) +
1
2
(L (c; L;) + H (c; L;)  2) c
+
1
2
24 LL+ 1r (1  L)  1r L (c; L;) c
+HL+ 1  L  H (c; L;) c
35 :
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The derivative of the objective function in the partial liquidation regime with respect to L
is given by
@EUPL
@L
=
1
2
@L (c; L;)
@L

1  1
r

c+
1
2
(L + H)  1
2

1 +
1
r

which is < 0 if @L(c;L;)
@L
= 0.
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